The Optimality of Morals

This post essentially follows on from the Notes on Kant post by David, which having prompted rather a lot of comments and one or two conversations, led to a few interesting conclusions on the subject of morality. Here, however, I mainly intend to express my own views and conclusions on the nature of morals (though David seems to be of much accordance, at least in his end point). I’ll leave it to anyone who wishes to comment to counter my points.

To start, I should mention that my own philosophy on morals seems to be largely in accordance with rule utilitarianism (or at a minor variant of it). What follows is pretty much the set of ideas that guided me to the eventual conclusion regarding optimality. Specifically, I argue that an action is moral if it is beneficial to either oneself or society (or both) and not detrimental to the well-being and continuation of the society as a whole. The intentions of the individual performing the action must also satisfy these conditions if the action is to be deemed moral, else the action must be morally neutral at best. Importantly, this specification implies that choices made with self-interest in mind can be moral so long as the communal benefit is non-negative. This becomes quite obvious given the assumption that the well-being of individuals in general contributes to the well-being of society (at least in an indirect way). Note that the arbiter in all these cases must be hypothetical as well as purely objective (nature itself, if you will), meaning that even though a certain action may be considered immoral as a consensus of society, it may nevertheless be neutral or even moral in actuality. Saying this, in a well-functioning and successful society, there would seem to be a general requirement that the judgement of moral worth of actions is reasonably accurate in a high proportion of situations.

Considering these points and their commonalities is primarily what led me to believe that when you boil everything down, morals are nothing but an approximation to optimality of society. Now as soon one mentions optimality, the question of a measure automaticfally follows. Of course, most people probably have some vague notion of what an “optimal society” is, but since the aim here is to be as formal and specific as possible, I really need to define a cost function, at least in loose terms. At this point, I would imagine that the opinions of most people would tend to diverge rapidly. Some would reason that the cost function is purely dependant on well-being/happiness/pleasure (whether more for the individual or society separates the hedonists from the utilitarians), while others would state the straightforward biological (yet to many cold and unpleasing) view that optimality is but a measure of the size of the population and thus the continued ability to self-replicate. Finally, the more religious among us might contend that optimality is simply the perfectly obedient following of teachings passed down to us by God. In essence, this cost function is nothing other than the “meaning of life” (in the widest possible sense) – something that may never be defined, and certainly not a discussion I’m going to include in this post! Whatever view people wish to take, I believe that the basic statement that “morals are an approximation for optimality” holds well in all cases. Like the nature of this optimality, the mechanism by which the concept of morality has been instilled in us (evolution, creationism, Spinoza’s God, or whatever) is also open to debate, but nonetheless is not able invalidate this theory in itself, at least in the way I see it. Yet all these concepts of optimality surely do have similarities. Another important feature of the cost function is that parameters should be not only the current state of humanity and the world, but also the states at points in the future (perhaps stretching infinitely far ahead in time). In the end, I think I can say that I do personally feel reasonably content with this definition of morals (albeit most likely an incomplete one). In my mind one cannot proceed any further in a formal definition without invoking reasons akin to the “meaning of life” such as those just mentioned – all very contentious or speculative and therefore not terribly helpful as bases for any fundamental theories, in my view.

Now to properly round off these theories, I ought to explain in more detail what I mean by an “approximation” to optimality. In my conclusion, I came to realise that moral principles (stressing the fact these principles are what are percdeived by men to be moral) may not necessarily lead to optimality in all cases, however you want to define the term. There can clearly exist an action performed at a certain time that to the best of everyone’s knowledge appears moral, yet has long-term ramifications that are generally negative – an unlikely case perhaps, but a quite possible one irrespective. It then follows that either a) the action cannot actually be considered absolutely moral because of these consequences in the (distant) future, or b) the motivation/action is perfectly moral (given the limitations in the nature of the actor) but not necessarily optimal under whatever cost function you choose. I would think option a) would appear immediately quite wrong, since it would contradict the idea that moral actions can be knowingly performed, which just silliness under any definition. We are then forced to accept option b), in other words that morals are only approximation guides to optimal behaviour and therefore optimal results (though most likely very good approximations). The next question is: does there exist any better approximation to optimality than morality? Of course, omniscience combined with perfect reasoning might be considered the ideal way to produce an optimal society and would seem to appear more “useful” than morals, but this is something which we as humans fall short of by an effectively infinite margin. Let’s suppose the evolutionary viewpoint for a moment here, simply because it leads to a curious hypothetical case. Is there a point at which we as a species may become intelligent enough to produce a more optimal society purely by reasoning? Is there a threshold at which it suddenly becomes more sensible to follow pure reason than moral instincts, or will both always be required to varying degrees? I’ll leave those questions unanswered, since they are largely side points to my cse, though it does at least highlight the issue in relation to current and past socities. Now surely no-one would argue that high-level reasoning can’t be used alongside (augmenting?) instinctual/inherent morals (indeed it is arguably a more “intelligent” form of morals that makes mankind particularly moral). Nevertheless it should be quite clear in looking around ourselves that there are dangers in the outcomes of limited reasoning overriding recognisably moral behaviour. Perhaps we can even attribute immoral behaviour at its root to to the arrogance or egotism (by this I really mean selfishness) of humans – whether in valuing their own well-being over that of society as a whole or their own powers of reasoning over moral principles. The latter is perhaps a more unintentional form, due to the failure of limited consciousness to realise its own limitations in forseeing complex (or at times even relatively simple) consequences of actions. To explain what might appear to be the widespread existance of the dominance of egotism in individuals’ personal cost functions, we may attribute this to the imperfection of our nature or the fact that evolution has taken an imperfect shortcut. In either case, it is certain that placing a significant weight on self-interest is highly beneficial to both the individual and the society, yet just a bit too much can have hugely negative effects. For me, what the commonness of egotism implies is nothing but the presence of something other than morality in people’s own cost functions – whereas morality has its benefits and imperfections, egotism simply has less of the former and more of the latter, and is grouped outside of morality for this reason (while a modicum of self-interest being on the moral side). Clearly, there is some sort of spectrum in judging the moral value of traits. Drawing all the previously mentioned things together, I feel I can now justify my definition of morality as an “approximation” or “shortcut” to optimal behaviour for the species as a whole.

It is without doubt important to stress that morals have their own imperfections and limitations, like analytical reasoning, and depend on the individuals (or society thereof) in which they have formed. Yet depending on how you look at it, morals have  evolved or been designed specifically for the purpose of optimal society. Although morality may be less adaptable than intelligence (at least over the timespans ranging from days to maybe lifetimes), it assuredly has a more “tailored” purpose, and therefore has its place alongside, and arguably ahead of, analytical reasoning.

If I were to now summarise how I believe optimal behaviour should be guided, I would say that it’s necessary to be somewhat careful not to propose something too uncomprimisable. In reality, it’s almost always the case that reasons are more intricate and subtle than immediately apparent. In stating an emphasis on paying due attention to intrinsic morals (loosely, which can be recognised as principles and codes that typically “feel right” and are “seen to be right” by concensus of society), and contrarily wariness in ignoring these morals in favour of some sort of pure reasoning. “Reasoning”, after all, when performed by humans, cannot help but be intruded by egotistical motives, among other notable imperfections. Do we not after all have a fear of so-called purely “rational” or “logical” machines not hesitating to perform tasks that are undeniably immoral in the eyes of man (if not only founded in science fiction and our imaginations)?

As a quick final note, I ought to mention that nowhere in my musings have I required morals to be static in nature. Equally, there would not seem to be any issue with them being unchangeable. At this point I’m further tempted to divide morals into two categories: intrinsic and social. Again, this is a matter on which I’m only going to lightly touch. The latter is the one of particular interest in that it could imply a varying cost function for optimality. It also suggests a mutual feedback cycle between the will of society and contemporary moral values (with analytical reasoning somewhere in the process, potentially acting both positively or negatively).

Right, so this post has wound on long enough by now, and is only getting increasingly vague and leaving more loose ends. Still, I hope that I’ve at least partially conveyed my theories and general impressions on the subject. I’m not sure how everything appears to others who haven’t followed the continuous discussion on the wider topic (largely originating with David’s post). I’d certainly be keen to hear what anyone else thinks on the subject and the ideas presented here. I would not at all be surprised to receive opinions that this relation of morals to optimailty seems distasteful or even incomplete to many people. Indeed, I am not sure that I am wholly satisfied with this explanation as the “root” of morals. (How can I, having already cynically accepted the fallibility of human rationalisation?) Maybe it is as a student of physics that I realise our theories of the nature, physical or human, are always but approximations to a more profound reality.

Machine Consciousness

This post is the result of a discussion between David (a friend of mine and engineering student) and myself. It ought to be read alongside his post on the same topic, which takes a quite different perspective on many of the matters. As he states, it is quite unlikely that (even between us) we will cover all the points made by the both of us, though I will certainly make an effort to do so.

I now forget how the debate arose, but its main theme ended up as follows: Are modern computers conscious/self-conscious to any degree and what is it exactly that makes them so, or indeed differentiates them from humans in this respect? It began as a rather scientific/technological discussion but turned out to involve a good deal of metaphysics (in which neither of us can claim to be well versed, though we certainly learnt much in the process).

To start I should note that where David refers to intelligence, I more often that not mean consciousness. In my opinion, intelligence of certain kinds is something already possesed by computers to varying degrees; their ability to perform calculations and analysis of some forms of data far surpasses that of humans whereas they are not nearly so adept at holistic analysis or creative thinking for example.

Before I get to the core of the discussion, it is important to firstly (try to) define a few terms. There is no general consensus on the exact meaning of consciousness but the introduction of the Wikipedia article offers a good idea of what I refer to when using the word. Self-consciousness (or self-awareness more accurately) is a much easier to define concept, if still not a concrete one: if anything can actively identify itself in a mirror (whether it be a physical or conceptual one), then it can be deemed self-aware. Several animals other than humans have been labelled as such on the basis of this test, such as chimpanzees, dolphins, and elephants. Now the question is whether computers can currently demonstrate this. An example given by David was a computer recognising its existence within a network by pinging itself via a remote device (if I remember correctly). His argument is that if the computer receives a successful reply, then it can clearly determine that it exists (the remote device would act as the mirror in this example) and is therefore self-aware. I dispute this argument primarily by asking whether the computer actively/explicitly realises that it exists. Firstly consider that it would be easy enough to fool the computer into believing that it does not exist on the network by returning a fake reply (or none at all). Also, in effect the programmer is telling the computer that it exists if it receives a successful reply, which fails to meet my criteria for self-awareness. In a way, the programmer is imparting his own realisation of the computer’s existence into it. Humans on the other hand can actively come to the conclusion that they exist (even without sensory information). They need not be told that they exist, but rather only to think about it. The famous statement by Rene Descartes, “Cogito, ergo sum” (“I think, therefore I am”) can be seen as proof of this. The same argument applies to the mirror test for self awareness in animals, although the difference there is that observers have to make the decision (albeit with very high probability) that the animal has shown signs of self-awareness. David refuted this explanation, suggesting that a person raised without any contact with others would not have the ability to come to the conclusion of their own existence. However the situation in fact then becomes similar to that of other intelligent self-aware animals which have not been trained in any meaningful way. I do concede that it is theoretically impossible to be sure of self-awareness in anything other than yourself on the basis of “Cogito, ergo sum”, though the fact that humans and animals have not been explicitly/consciously programmed gives a good indication that self-awareness arose independently.

This whole argument leads onto the (wholly philosophical and non-empirical) issue of from where consciousness is derived. It is believed (or has at least been proposed) by some that all biological organisms have a certain level of consciousness (though not necessarily self-awareness). For example, the cells that compose an organism could be seen to have a certain level of conciousness (by the definition given earlier), while the whole organism could be seen to have a greater one. Similarly, the Gaia hypothesis (especially that presented by Isaac Asimov in his Foundation series) proposes that the Earth has a supreme level of consciousness, which is greater than the sum of its component consciousnesses (including humans and other organisms). It goes as far as to suggest innanimate matter has a minute amount of consciousness, though I suspect this was a unique idea for the sake of fiction. This theory can be summarised by the statement “the whole is greater that the sum of its parts”, which comes up in various places but I feel is perhaps most appropiate here. As I warned, the topic has now diverged completely from empirical science, since no-one currently knows a way to measure consciousness quantatively (or even define it in a concrete way). Continuing nonetheless; a computer may be said to derive its consciousness from either its programmers, internally, or from a combination of both. Humans may be considered to derive their consciousness internally (the neural networks of the brain are created from innanimite matter via biological growth and are developed with learning). Whether an entity derives its consciousness from a few other highly conscious entities (such as the prorgammers) or a multitude of entities with very low consciousnesses (such as cells and micro-organisms) could perhaps define what is to be considered independantly conscious (though there is clearly a grayscale here). We did not discuss this particular area too far as it was becoming horrifically abstract, though I think we both agreed that it was an interesting idea.

The final point made by David in his post is regarding the increase in the complexity (again another loosely defined concept) of an entity (system) in order to completely understand itself. His point is that the complexity will eventually converge to a finite value as a system grows indefinitely in order to understand itself. (See his post for a proper explanation.) A solely hypothetical question, but nonetheless intriguing. This view seems intuitively wrong to me, but specifically it would seem necessary that the system would have to recomprehend its entire self as it increases its complexity (and therefore level of consciousnes), since fully understanding the original system and the additional parts of it would not imply an understanding of the overall system (if you subscribe to the view that “the whole is greater that the sum of its parts”).

I don’t think I can comment very well on my general philosophical views as David has (though take what has been offered already). Looking briefly at some of the terminology however, I seem to largely subscribe to the philosophies of Holism and Emergentism, which appear to contradict with his views, as I might expect. (Why else would I be writing a post on the same topics?) Still, I subscribe very much to empiricism, with the small caveat that our knowledge of metaphysics is too small and basic to yet apply it to that too. (As a student of physics, I would be worried if I didn’t!)

Now that I’ve finally made this post (after much goading to fulfill my promise) and David has likewise made his own, I’m hoping that this debate is ended for the time being but that these posts stand well as records of our philosophical views.